

Civil Resistance and Contentious Politics

Creating Opportunities through Information and Communication
Technologies

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Introduction

Information and communication Technologies (ICTs) such as cell phones, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Livejournal, and blogs have empowered non-state actors to share information at a low cost and communicate with a global audience. Because technology has become increasingly more affordable and widespread new tactics and patterns for civil resistance and social movements have developed. Not restricted by temporal and geographical boundaries anymore many movements utilise ICTs to communicate with other actors transitionally. As a result, today ICTs serve as a resource for many movements which use them to disseminate information, coordinate, and mobilise action through social networks, online communities and other forms of media. ICTs are a versatile resource and thus social and civil resistance movements appropriate their usage according to their needs; some coordinate and mobilise through them, while others use them to gain access to media and government agencies, information gatekeepers or policy makers, to supplement and promote their work.

It appears that ICTs if used properly represent a tipping point for modern day social movements to become potentially more powerful and effective. ICTs can act as a tipping point because they have two very effective usages: coordination and dissemination of information. Both of these usages can significantly enhance and add to movement strategies and tactics. This leads to power diffusion towards non-state actors and the resulting increase in communication opportunities often results in non-state actors gaining soft power. Considering the adaptable utility, potential and increasing usage of ICTs it is important to pose several questions. How and under what conditions can ICTs serve as a asset and what are their a potential weaknesses? Are the new tactics and patterns examined in this research effective in achieving goals? For this research I will examine the role of ICTs in social and civil resistance movements limited to campaigns that directly targeted state policy.

The first chapter will introduce the reader to the necessary background information to understand the issue at hand. The following chapter will explore how ICT's can enhance a social movement and the importance of media forms for movements. The third chapter will explore will address the shortcomings of ICTs and the fourth chapter examines the future and utility of ICTs for social movements.

Methods

My research primarily utilised qualitative research on social movements, protests, and events whose campaigns targeted the nation state within the past ten years. My research was conducted through content analysis from news sources and online communication materials. The events and movement examined for this research were analysed in accordance with communication movement theory coming from academic scholarship. As the events studied for this research have occurred in the recent months to the past five years there was a lack of academic research and publication for many of them. Thus, information from the following sources were used :

- news media (exp. Al Jazeera or the BBC)
- publications (exp. Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy)
- citizen, academic, and live blogs
- online communities curating relevant topics (exp. Global Voices Online)
- research databases (exp. OpenNet Initiative)
- microblogging platforms (exp. twitter)
- social networking platforms (exp. Facebook)
- content storing and hosting sites (exp. GoogleDocs, Youtube)
- websites of civil society organisations and movements (exp. Reporters Without Borders, Committee to Protect Journalism, or CANVAS)
- Archives (particularly Twitter which only allows for searching of content with the past ten days)

Verification of information was a key aspect for materials gathered online. Authenticating and verify content coming from online sources, which was a key factor for materials being used or excluded from my research. The nature of citizen media and online content often makes it difficult to verify the credibility of information. Thus I established several methods to verify materials. These differed for each platform but generally I would seek to find multiple sources and cross reference to verify information. Another difficulty was to find accurate numbers of participants in social movements and protestors, as this generally is difficult to establish, and relied on news media, and civil society organisations for these numbers.

In addition, I would research which sources and information were utilised by news agencies and civil society organisations. It proved important to find original information (exp. original tweets instead of re-tweets), which contained time, and temporal data, which would allow further examination and authentication of information. For blogs, websites, and citizen media I would look at the history of content and how long the account had been active. This provided insight into how long these actors were established and had a credible history of knowledge and commitment to the issue.

Information posted by individuals on platforms such as Facebook, Youtube, or Twitter led me to research the users history of online activity. Particularly how long before the events accounts had been established, what other content was published, and the users connections and friendships to others and how active these were. If accounts emerged during the protests, did not have a established profile (through profile pictures, user information, and no friends) I was hesitant to accept materials from these sources. Because through the course of protests and movements many new accounts emerged which would actively post information but had a higher potential to be biased, contain misinformation, and at times were only established to support or oppose a movement. To verify videos and photographs I often attempted to verify the contents through finding common elements such as

language, street signs, stores, license plates, or sights. Through these methods I tried to ensure and establish the credibility of the materials used.

Chapter 1

Challenging Power

“First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.”

-Gandhi

This chapter will examine how civil resistance forms, how they are linked to political opportunities¹, and what tactics they employ for the process of contentious politics.. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton define Civil Resistance as the

type of political action that relies on the use of non-violent methods. It is largely synonymous with certain other terms, including ‘non-violent action’, ‘non-violent resistance’, and ‘people power’. It involves a range of widespread and sustained activities that challenge a particular power, force, policy or regime—hence the term ‘resistance’. The adjective ‘civil’ in this context denotes that which pertains to a citizen or society, implying that a movement’s goals are ‘civil’ in the sense of being widely shared in a society; and it generally denotes that the action concerned is non-military or non-violent in character. (Roberts & Garton Ash, 2009)

Civil Resistance movements have developed new processes and mechanisms² to operate and achieve their goals, many of them using technology to aid them in their work. Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly have identified three mechanisms for contentious politics for examining contentious politics and movements. These are:

- Brokerage: production of a new connection between previously unconnected sites
- Diffusion: spread of a form of connection, to an issue, or a way of framing it from one site to another
- Coordinated action: two or more actors’ engagement in mutual signalling and parallel making of claims on the same object (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007)

These mechanism combine into processes called “new coordination” which consists of Brokerage creating new connections among actors, which leads to diffusion and coordinate actions. Diffusion can lead to coordinated action as well because it allows for the spread of ideas, practices, and resources among actors making coordination possible (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). New coordination can lead to the creation of new

¹ Political opportunities are consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics. (Tarrow 1998)

² Processes are “regular combinations and sequences of mechanism that produce similar transformations of those elements”. Mechanisms are a “delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations”. (Tilly and Tarrow 2007)

connections across temporal and physical boundaries, which can lead to coordinated or syndicated action leading to upward or downwards “scale shifts” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) Scale shifts represent “the complex process that not only diffuses contention across space or social, sectors, but creates instances for new coordination at a higher[upward] or lower[downward] level than its initiation.” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) Upward scale shifts leads to the inclusion of actors at a regional, national, or international level while downward scale shifts leads to the involvement at a more regional level. When new coordination is combined with the use of ICTs it can create political opportunities and support civil resistance. Particularly new communication technologies can enable scale shifts and support new coordination which I examine by looking at the student movement Otpor in Serbia and the flash mobs in Belarus.

ICTs, New coordination, and Soft Power

Information and communication technologies were utilised all over the world to accomplish movement’s goals. In the Philippines the use of cell phones aided the mobilisation of protestors to overthrow President Estrada in 2001, the 2011 Egyptian revolution widely utilised ICTs to share information with global news media. Burmese activists, during the 2007 Saffron Revolution, used cell phones and the Internet to share information and pictures outside of Burma. In Moldova social networking sites were used to organise flash mobs. All of these movements used ICTs to diffuse information among the public and for Brokerage. Furthermore these movements all made use of soft power or co-optive power, which is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a [country's] culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced” (Nye, 2004) Soft power has been used by civil resistance movements, to gain ideological influence to achieve their goals and objectives by appealing to the public through processes that will create diffusion of their ideas.

Diffusion and Brokerage through ICTs have enabled activists and movements to establish independent platforms to share information and organise online, outside of the control of the nation state. Individuals have in the past away been the end consumer of information but ICTs have allowed anyone to be a consumer and producer of information. Through ICTs individuals are now able to produce, share, and disseminate information quickly, at a low cost to a global audience. This has brought a change in power because “technology has been diffusing power away from governments, and empowering individuals and groups to play roles in world politics—including wreaking massive destruction—which were once reserved to governments.” (Nye, 2004)

A critical change is that actors can achieve a great deal by including ICTs in their processes without being resource rich. Access to ICTs is continuously becoming easier, cheaper, and is mobile which if utilised correctly makes it a resourceful asset to movements. Traditionally one needed to have economic resources and military power bring down governments. But now potentially this something ordinary citizen can achieve.

Social and civil resistance movements which target the nation state, instead of a private cooperation or business, can face more difficulties as the nation state is resource rich, and has more hard³ and soft power. Governments can choose how they react and police protests, how to counteract it, and oppose them. Furthermore the nation state has more hard power and resources available since it controls the police force, the military, communication resources as the Internet or mobile phone networks, and has direct access to the media. Depending on state opportunities for public protests and gatherings can be limited as many repressive governments put a cap or impose restrictions for the formation of public gatherings. Likewise government can choose if they will tolerate active opposition groups and can try to break up political organisations, which makes it difficult to maintain formal opposition movements. When social movements face a oppressive regime the challenges and risks multiply. Often when movements do emerge they are met with violent opposition and are broken up by force. Thus in order to challenge power people need to find alternative ways to coordinate, form movements, and protest

Belarus: Diffusing Contention through Flash Mobs

The government of Belarus enforces a strict ban on public assembly and protests. This makes it difficult for opposition forces to mobilise protests, especially because citizens are aware that they will most likely be met by the riot police and broken up by force. To protest the restriction on public gatherings and build a civil resistance movement against the government, flash mobs were organised online.⁴ Livejournal, a online community page, ICQ, a instant messaging program, and text messages were among the most used to share information and organise flash mobs. Usually the flash mobs were not announced until forty eight hours or less before the event to prevent the government from finding out about it. (Tactics) The flash mobs in Belarus were simple and didn't require many resources since only the Internet and mobile phones were needed. Often a description such as this was shared online:

Mass action on April 8

Reason: Lukashenko's coronation.

Location: all cities and towns of Belarus, abroad. Wherever you are, take part.

Time: April 8, Saturday, all day long.

Essence: Go out into the streets, hang black ribbons everywhere, dress in black yourself, carry black balloons. Black user pictures in your LiveJournals.

In short, the more black, the better. (Khokhlova, 2006)

Most flash mobs in Belarus were organised in a similar manner. The flash mobs in Belarus were used a tool for diffusion to address peoples contention through various messages. One of the flash mobs gathered around 70 people at a post office to all fill

³ Joseph Nye defines hard power to be “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will” (Nye 2004)

⁴ Flash mobs are “a large group of people who assemble suddenly in a public place, perform an unusual and pointless act for a brief time, then disperse” (Wikipedia)

out money orders to cause confusion for bystanders and the police force since it was not unusual or illegal to fill out money orders. But This time it was just done in a large group of strangers. Other flash mobs had more inferred more ideological meaning as when flash mobbers met in a public square to read the official newspaper, the Soviet Belarus, and simultaneously began to tear it into pieces. Another flash mob took place in Minsk's October square, in front of a large television screen which broadcasted official state news . There flash mobbers blindfolded themselves and all turned their back to the television screen. (Ousmanova, 2010)

These flash mobs did not have directly stated political agenda, but had inherent meaning. Nevertheless they posed a threat to the government as it showed that people could mobilise and it also provided a public display of the governments repressive actions by breaking up harmless events. Moreover the flash mobs were documented which provided permanent examples of the governments actions against harmless citizens. Photographs, and videos of the flash mobs also could be used to to mock the government in a form that could not easily be silenced. For April Fools day in 2006 information online was spread to meet dressed up in clown costumes at the Dynamo stadium in Minks. The riot police and KGB intent on preventing the flash mob prepared at the stadium to find out that they had been tricked and no flash mob had taken place. People who spread the information about the supposed flash mob were hiding in bushes and photographed the police force and KGB to share the "unapproved gathering of law enforcement officials" (Ousmanova, 2010) This mocked the government but also showed that actors could coerce government responses and actions.

While these events are not blatantly political they do carry inferred political messages. The flash mobs gathered in major public spaces to partake in trivial acts that are not against the law or physically threatening, along with having the public as a audience. However, these flash mobs were still broken up by the police despite that they were non-violent, had no agenda, plan, or verbalised anything. The government broke up these flash mobs because it showed the potential for citizen to organise and coordinate with each other Furthermore this was done in the public space, and showed the potential that a fairly large number of people could be brought together in a public space through sharing information online. But if the government didn't react it indicated that groups could form and continue to form potentially larger groups for specific events, which could engage in action opposing the government.

Equally important is the ability to document the flash mobs and police response to them through camera phones, and videos which can be shared online, offline and with the media. In fact nothing "nothing screams police-state" more then breaking up non threatening and insignificant citizen action. (Shirky, 2009) These flash mobs demonstrate an alternative way to act against a governments, criticise it, and draw attention to it. This kind of criticism cannot be avoided by the government in either way because flash mobs attract attention and if broken up the attention only multiplies, thus only further diffusing contention against the government. Furthermore this allows movements to, through indirect means, create brokerage to build a counter culture and diffuse ideas about the government, which is a form of soft power. This also enables the power to challenge soft and hard power.

Civil Resistance through Performance

In Serbia the student movement Otpor formed in 1998, as a response to actions and policies of the Milošević government. Otpor's strategies embraced nonviolent actions, based on the writing of Gene Sharp, a political science professor who wrote *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, a handbook which has been utilised by activists all over the world e.g. Egypt, Iran, and Serbia. Sharp advocates non-violence, especially when a movement is met with violence by the opposition, and advises movements to document events, through photographs and videos and share these with others. (Sharp, 2002) One of the core beliefs of Sharp's approach is that resistance should be built through the elimination of fear of a government through mocking of the government and undermining its authority.

Under Milošević's regime it was difficult to mobilise and lead public protests, as these would be broken up violently. Furthermore the mass media was heavily censored and independent media was being silenced by the government. This led to Otpor finding other means of civil resistance to oppose the government through the use of satire and mockery to undermine and criticise Milošević's government. Instead of public protests Otpor's members would perform individual acts, mocking the regime. An example of these acts is an activist rolling a barrel down the street, with Milošević's picture on it and asking people to donate money into the barrel for his retirement. People could donate one dinar and then they got the opportunity to hit the barrel with a bat. If they did not have any money to spare because of Milošević's government then they should hit the barrel twice for free. (Smiljanic, 2003) After the police removed the barrel Otpor released a press statement that the police had arrested the barrel. They would also say that the action was a huge success, because they had collected enough money for Milošević's retirement, and that the police would give the money to Milošević. (Johansen, 2008).

This is what Otpor refers to as a dilemma action (Rosenberg, 2011), and considers effective as Ivan Marovic, one of Otpor's leaders, explains dilemma actions occur if the police does "not touch the barrel more people are coming and if they take it away they look silly" and this "destroys the loyalty, in this case of the police force. The police force doesn't think that you are right, doesn't necessarily need to like the movement. But what this action creates is that they stop trusting in the wisdom of their leadership. Because the regime puts them in the situation where they have to arrest a barrel." (I3IVIIVI, 2011) This is similar to the Belarusian flash mob which coerces the government to respond to citizen activity and display unreasonably repressive action by government forces, yet only required one actor instead of mobilising a group of actors.

Otpor engaged in many public acts of poking fun at the government in simple acts, which didn't require a crowd of activists, but could be performed with little resources, nor did it need to spread information to inform people. Activists could go wherever they wanted and diffuse contention in the form of mockery, satire, and theatrical acts which then would travel through word of mouth among the Serbian public. As Nye states it is easier to attract people to ideas than to force them, which is

co-optive power which Otpor did which attracted support and other activists. For this reason Otpor was able to make behaviour a powerful resource of civil resistance. The activists behaviours cannot be considered illegal nor ethically wrong but the actors behaviour has inferred notions and attitude against Milošević's politics which were obvious to everyone.

The use of theatrical acts by Otpor inspired others and made it harder for the government to exercise control people as these acts slowly removed the publics fear of the government. Using methods like the above mentioned ones lets other people know that there are others who feel the same and are willing to act, which empowers people. Moreover it lead to diffusion of new ideas, practices and let people know where to go to resist the government as each Otpor activist was a broker for the movement.

These individual acts of bravery build were one way Otpor built civil resistance against the government. Another form was through spreading Otpor's symbol, a black clenched fist. The black Otpor fist was spread all over cities in Serbia as graffitist and posters to mark Otpor's presence. In addition messages were spread such as for Milošević's 59th birthday for which Otpor spread this message on blistering card throughout Serbia.

Thank you for the childhood you have taken from us, for the unforgettable war scenes you have given us, for all the crimes you have committed in the name of Serbs, for all the lost battles. ... Thank you for the unforgettable convoys of our brothers, for the sound of air raid sirens, for all the lives lost in vain Happy birthday, Mr. President, may you celebrate the next one with your nearest and dearest on a deserved holiday in the Hague. (Rubin, 2000)

Otpor did not entirely rely on ICTs to support the movement as in 2000 Internet access was not widespread in Serbia. Not many activists had access to ICTs but Otpor itself used the Internet and mobile phones as the two main mean for communications. In a Interview of Ivan Marovic, a leader of Otpor, by Fabien Miard, explained that Otpor used "the Internet between offices (laptops were still expensive) and mobile phones because of their abundant availability." as the "The Internet was important for strategic communication. The website with the information about the movement, news, documents and recruitment forms. On the other hand, cell phones were crucial for operational and tactical communication."(Miard, 2008) Mobile phones were very important for Otpor to reach out to supporters and others while the Internet played a minor role. The movement relied on cell phones, and had software that would message databases, to communicate quickly and in real time. However phones proved imperative to coordinate operational needs especially for Otpor's tactic of "Plan B" demonstration.

Furthering Contention through Public Support and Arrests

Plan B demonstrations were a response following the arrest of an Otpor activist for which, activist, supporters, and the media were quickly mobilised to the police

station to support the arrested activists by protesting outside of the station. One arrested Otpor activists tells that when they were released

We were welcomed by about a hundred students and many journalists who wanted to hear our stories and take our pictures. Our friend, who got arrested first, was also released, but unfortunately had been badly beaten. After it was all over, we found out why we were released so suddenly and why the policemen were nervous. Political parties and local NGOs had sent a letter protesting our arrest throughout the world, and in a few minutes many international organisations and NGOs signed on. The letter was addressed to Slobodan Milošević and the minister of justice, asking for the immediate release of the innocent arrested students. We also contacted friendly lawyers and called on opposition parties to condemn the arrests through the media present at the event. All of these elements, the opposition parties, media, student activists, lawyers and NGOs played a role in getting the word out. (Smiljanic, 2003).

For many of the event Otpor had prepared a Plan B to respond to arrests. The Plan B was prepared and organised in advance to respond to incidents quickly. For these Otpor organised a number of activists who would be prepared in Otpor's offices in case of a incident during events, kept a list of activists on stand by which could be quickly informed and mobilised by phone, ensured there were lawyers on stand-by for immediate legal support, kept media contacts to call for coverage in front of the police stations, and informed NGO's and other oppositional parties in advance about Otpor events. This allowed for quick and efficient mobilisation, which was primarily coordinated through text messaging on cell phones. Otpor had built large databases of activists, supporters, and relevant organisations. Often these lists were destroyed which lead to the practice of individuals holding contacts for 10-15 people, which they were responsible for. Then if needed Otpor would begin the "response mobilisation" which resulted in

The press team started contacting the local, independent TV and radio stations, journalists and press photographers by phone, fax and e-mail. Press releases called upon citizens to gather in front of the police station where the arrested activists were taken. NGOs and opposition parties were also contacted and they called their own members to meet in front of the police station. The idea was to spread the information personally. (Smiljanic, 2003)

This allowed the movement to quickly coordinate actions needed to respond to the police forces and attracted others to Otpor's movement. The harder the government tried to oppose Otpor through violence and arrests the more it build its opposition. But if the government didn't respond it would allow people to oppose them and undermine them in public. This was enabled by strategically utilising cell phones which provide the advantage to respond and communicate in real time communication while providing mobility during events. Otpor did not rely on

technology to oppose Milošević government but effectively used them as part of their tactic to undermine the governments power.

Civil resistance in Belarus and Serbia, utilised Information and Communication Technology to support their movement campaigns and create political opportunities, coordinate action and mobilise activists . Mobile communication technologies proved to be among the most effective to adapt to events and to respond in real time to coordinate and respond to events. Yet both movements did not rely on ICTs as their key tool for contention as these technologies can easily be monitored, are not as widespread and visible to many, and are vulnerable to government interference. These movements rather intended to oppose the government by slowly undermining the perception of the state's power and standing among citizens. This was achieved through sustained innovative tactics and processes, leading to civil pressure on the government, which made use of ICTs.

In contrast to these movements the 2011 Spanish 15-M movement and the 2011 Greek Indignant Citizens Movement both protesting against government corruption and the economic conditions . Both were a series of ongoing demonstrations and occupations of public squares which were entirely organised through social networks. The Spanish 15-M movement took place in May 2011 and began with a demonstration that led to the occupation of Madrid's main square, Puerta del Sol. The 15-M movement was organised by ¡Democracia Real YA! on the May 15, 2011 in 58 Spanish cities on its online platform, which was established in early 2011. The movement widely utilised the Internet to mobilise and attract protestors to all over Spain.

The 15-M movement relied on social networking platforms such as their "Spanish Revolution" Facebook page and their twitter hashtags #acampadasol (Sol encampment), #notenemosmedo (we have no fear), #nosquedamos (we are staying) or #spanishrevolution as tools to broker and diffuse their messages and information. During my visit to the protestors encampment at Puerta del Sol one found a very organised set up of tents and resources. Among the different station set up were bookshops providing literate and background information on Spanish political history, basic supply stores, blanket checkout stations, and a communications station which was equipped with makeshift solar panels to provide electricity. The station was surrounded by signs re-directing people to online resources such as the ¡Democracia Real YA! website, Facebook pages, Twitter feeds, and live video streaming channels.

The online faces of the movement were continuously updated. In addition the Internet was also used to coordinate resource during the encampment and to bring in materials needed. The movement's occupation of the public square lasted about three weeks. After which it was dismantled and the protestors had reached the agreement to return protests once a week all over Spain. (Tremlett, 2011)

A study by the Cocktail Analysis on "Movilización y redes sociales" (Mobilization and social networks) found that 51.9 % found out about first the 15-M movement

through television and 29.6 percent found out first on the internet. When users wanted to find further information 43.1% went online for which social networks were the prime source of information at 53.8% (Analysis, 2011).

Similarly the Greek Indigants movement was highly publicized through Facebook events calling for protest at Athens Syntagma Square and all over Greece on May 25, 2011 which led to the occupation of Syntagma Square till June 30, 2011 (London, 2011) The protests and square occupation attracted a diverse crowd but the movement did not tolerate or seek the involvement of officially political parties, but claimed they were a movement without political affiliation or representations. (Oakland Commune, 2011) The movement was motivated by the recent Spanish 15-M movement and opposed the vote for further austerity measures. Protestors were frustrated with the Greek governance and the implications of the financial crisis which seemed to be the main motifs for the protests.

The Spanish and Greek civil resistance movements have both employed similar patterns and mechanism to make themselves heard. Both movements mobilized because they were frustrated with their government and the financial crisis which led protestors to voice their frustrations by occupying public spaces and holding demonstrations. The Spanish and Greek movements both were in similar in the way that they mobilized a large amount of people, occupied public spaces which were usually in the center of cities thus could not be ignored by the public, media, and politicians. Furthermore occupying public space made it more difficult to break up protestors compared to protestors who are moving in a large group. Also sustained occupation of one space allows for bystanders to easily join and protestors can decide when to go to the squares and join the occupation movement as the whereabouts and when time of the movement were not restricted to a specific time but were continuously stationary. This allowed for easier participation. Unlike Belarus and Serbia these movements heavily relied on ICTs as the foundation to create brokerage among actors, diffuse information, and bring about collective action. This created a large diverse network of people which were weakly linked but came together to their frustration with their governments.

Furthermore both movements did not have clearly defined goals as to what they aimed to achieve and demand. The Greek Indignant most clear goal one can assume is the opposing of the austerity measures which the government voted on and passed besides the Greek civil resistance. but the protestors also widely expressed their dismay against the Greek financial crisis and economy, high unemployment, and welfare cuts. Similarly the Spanish M-15 protestors seemed to be frustrated because of high unemployment, economic conditions, and political corruption. Both of these movements motivations are rather vague sentiments nor do they have specific demands. They can be considered to be ideologically thin as the diversity and non political affiliation of the movements make it difficult to find a common ideological formulation and idea. (Bennett, 2003) This led to a movement that mobilized large numbers remarkably quickly but resulted in a campaign that "transmits political messages with relatively little ideological elaboration beyond basic appeal to justice or fairness, and with a heavy reliance on lifestyle symbols as vehicles for political messages." (Bennett, 2003)

Chapter 2

Civil Resistance, Media and the Information Age

“The media's the most powerful entity on earth. They have the power to make the innocent guilty and to make the guilty innocent, and that's power. Because they control the minds of the masses.”

- Malcolm X

Civil resistance often attempted to establish a narrative of their campaign in the mass media since the mass media is the link between politics and the public sphere. Visibility in the mass media is important for civil resistance as it allows for diffusion and contact with the opposition movement which I will establish in this chapter.

Salience and the Mass Media

Generally the mass media allows for information delivery outside of our personal experiences. Through media, citizens are able to bear indirect witness to events that they have no access to. The information provided by the media is selective, as it has a limited carrying capacity (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Meaning the media can only cover selected topics, since there is too much occurring in the world to cover, resulting in limited and selective coverage. Media selectivity highlights events that have social or political importance because the presentation of information shapes our knowledge and understanding of the world. This shapes the public's understanding of social reality. Thus the media has the power to highlight the importance of an event by emphasizing it in the media. McCombs and Shaw defined this as “agenda-setting theory.” (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 1997) The theory argues that the prominence given to an issue in the media will transfer to the public's opinion and priorities. This is defined as salience transfer, which is the media's ability to confer importance and urgency on various issues through setting news agendas. According to Spiro Kiousis salience is given to issues through dimensions: attention, prominence, and (Kiousis, 2004). Attention dictates how much coverage and exposure is given to a story, prominence refers to how much importance is given to the story, and valence refers to what emotions have been attached to the issue. All of these can impact the public's attitude about events and how much they will want to become invested in an event.

Civil Resistance demand for Media Attention

Civil resistance movements often lack the resources and power to directly access politicians and policymakers which requires them reach out to other who can speak on their behalf and advocate their cause. Thus civil resistance campaigns need to engage other outside agents that do have forms of access to policymakers or have

the ability to draw the public attention to the movement's agenda and existence. Professor Michael Lipsky identified this to be a fundamental strategy of social movements. Lipsky finds that social movements attempt to draw third parties into conflict "in order to raise the stakes in the conflict and bring favorable pressure to bear on the policy process." (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996) Engaging and being visible in the media proves to be one of the most effective ways to do this. Since it will bring it civil resistance campaigns to the attention of the public and policy makers thus making it a priority to address.

Most movements utilize some form of citizen media, which allows them to share information, build online communities, and extensive networks for information exchange. It also allows them to build indirect links to mass media outlets. According to Jonah Peretti's there are three classes of distribution technologies: micro, middle and mass media which all share information differently (Peretti, 2007). Micro media encompasses personal blogs, emails, cell phones, and personal websites. Mirco media acts as a digital word of mouth, which relies on personal communication among friends and acquaintances. Middle media consist of platforms and sites collecting information from many sources of information such as organizations, blogs, and news sites to create online collections of information. Micro and middle media allow social movements to establish independent news sources and sharing of information, outside of the mass media and still reaching media audiences and the public. The mass media encompasses newspapers, movies, radio, television, and the Internet.

However often mirco and middle technologies forms are not effective enough as they attract specific interest groups, which results in cyberbalkanization (Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 2005). Cyberbalkanization leads to online groups attracting individuals with the same interests and preferences. Thus only people with particular preferences and interests access these online media sources, leading many micro and middle media forms to only be sought out by small sub-groups rather than the general public. While this fosters discussion and participation in sub groups it limits the exposure of information to specific groups. Thus mass media still is the most effective form to reach larger audiences because it is the easiest information source to seek out by the public, but it also allows information recipients to be passive. In contrast online media allows recipients to actively choose and seek out information, instead of being the end-consumer of information.

Thus movements have to avoid only reaching out to a limited audience as it will limit the movements exposure. Instead movements aim to gain support from the general public because it can lead to more widespread support for their campaigns. More widespread support and media exposure can bring attention to a movements campaign and translate into salience. This is the case because "mass media [is] nonetheless the means through which the majority of citizens establish contact with the political sphere" (Van de Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004) Jürgen Habermas has established that the public sphere is a political tool which is "a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment." (Habermas, 1989) The previous statement suggests that the public sphere and the state are linked as they respond to

each others actions and interests. As a result the media is the predominant tool that communicates the interests and actions of both.

Civil Resistance, Gatekeepers, and Media Agendas

In order to be placed on news agendas a movement needs to bypass “gatekeepers” of the media. Maxwell McCombs defines gatekeepers to consist of “three key elements: major sources who provide information for news stories, other news organizations, and journalisms norms and traditions.” (McCombs, 2004) Examples of major sources are organizations such as the New York Times, Reuter, politicians, or professional organizations. Because they are professional in nature they represent a challenge to independent movements because they are outside of these organizations. Furthermore it is difficult for independent actors to gain access to major news agendas since one needs to have the resources and affiliations.

Thus bypassing gatekeeper is a difficult option for the independent and emerging movements studied in this paper because “the voices that gain access to the media predominantly belong to those groups already established.” (McAdam, et al., 1996). This leads to movements needing to seek out other means to gain media attention by which it can “either solicit the support of dissident elite groups directly, or else it must use the (often unfriendly) media attention gained from outrageous behavior to attract potential allies among other uninvolved elites.” (McAdam, et al., 1996)

This is when platforms such as Twitter or Facebook become valuable as they can be utilized in movement tactics to promote their cause and coordinate action. When used properly these can act as versatile media platforms. These platforms can either be used to mobilize people to come to protest, as was the case for the flash mobs in Belarus, for crowdsourcing⁵ online, or to push media attention through collective action online and offline.

Shifting Power through Public Pressure

The media forgo’s many news stories for various reasons which will lead to the exclusion of globally important events as it was the case for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 which has was labelled a “forgotten conflict” because of the media silence during the conflict. In 2009 former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that “You cannot have Rwanda again because information would come out far more quickly about what is actually going on and the public opinion would grow to the point where action would need to be taken.” and “Foreign policy can no longer be the province of just a few elites.” This is not necessary true as there are many conflicts and events which do not receive coverage. Such was the case for the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011, for which there was a lack of attention from the international media. If a event is ignored in the media actors need to find ways to draw in media attention, which activists did during the 2009 Green Revolution through the use of Twitter.

⁵ Crowdsourcing is “taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually an employee) and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an open call” (Howe, 2006)

On Monday, June 15th, 2009, Twitter announced a delay of a critical system wide update, which would temporarily cut access to the site, after US government officials reached out to Twitter, asking for a delay of the update. This was asked for because Twitter was widely utilized by Iranian protestor for the Green Revolution to share information about the protests, coordinate, and report in real time. Twitter officially acknowledged this on their blog as they “recognize the role Twitter is currently playing as an important communication tool in Iran. Tonight's planned maintenance has been rescheduled to tomorrow between 2-3p PST (1:30a in Iran)” (Biz, 2009) Thus moving the update of Twitter, which would have made the website inaccessible during the daytime in Iran, to 1:30am in Iran. This illustrates the growing importance of communication tools during protests as a tool to communicate, coordinate, and share real time information among protestors and the rest of the web. Twitter was among the most widely utilized tools by protesors to gain international media attention, share information with global media outlets, redirecting to resources, bypass government censorship. Twitter, and other ICTs, such as camera phones, e-mail, Facebook and YouTube, were used to document and share what was happening during the protests in response to the 2009 Iranian presidential election results, which were disputed and considered to have been rigged in favor of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Coercing Media attention through Crowdsourcing

Following the controversial election supporters of Hossein Mousavithe, the opposing presidential candidate, began protesting the election results which lead to the Green Revolution in 2009. The protestors began a to continuously report on what was happening by posting pictures, videos, and information online to communicate with other protestor and the rest of the world. But many news agencies did not report on the uprising of 10,000 people, particularly CNN was silent about the events Iran.

This lead to many twitter users posting message with the hashtag⁶ “#CNNfail.” In order to draw attention to CNN’s lack of coverage such as “We need #IranElection on top of trending topics. Please RT and spread the word. #CNNfail” (thepete, 2009) and “#iranelection #cnnfail @cnn @gawker CNN now covering Heidi and Spencer during riot police fanning out in Iran. CNN: FAIL.” (Waitsfan1, 2009)

Protestors used Twitter to spread the news about the protests in Iran and called for the media attention of one of the largest news network to bring awareness to the Green Revolution. The tweets with #CNNFail and #iranelection⁷ spread rapidly on twitter and were picked up by many other micro and middle media platforms globally. The wide presence of #CNNfail post globally created pressure for CNN to report on Iran’s election. ReadWriteWeb which was one of the first blogs to pick up on the events in Iran and called out CNN in their article “Dear CNN, Please Check Twitter for News About Iran” (Kirkpatrick, 2009) which was an action many other sites copied. Shortly after CNN increased its coverage of the Iranian elections and even featured Iran’s election as a top story on their website. The large

⁶ a hashtags allow to add metadata to tweets and create themed grouping of tweets

⁷ 2nd most tweeted hashtag in 2009 (Abdur, 2009)

amount of noise online about Iran pressured CNN into reporting on Iran which the head of CNN International, Tony Maddox, referred to the Twitter campaign as “real-time audience response”(Twitter 1, CNN 0, 2009) giving individuals the power to influence the news networks content. The protestors in Iran and supporters online managed to create pressure through publicity by crowdsourcing.

Chapter 3

Shortcomings of ICTs

“A free society is one where it is safe to be unpopular.”

- Adlai E. Stevenson

Information and Communication technology can be used for a multitude of events and practices but each one has its advantages and disadvantages. While ICTs have the potential to enhance civil resistance movements the use of them can create vulnerabilities for movements and individual actors. Among these disadvantages are ICTs potential to amplify misinformation, give access to common knowledge to activists and opposition groups, difficulty to hold online actors political accountable, user anonymity, and identity, and that many ICTs are owned and controlled by private corporations.

Information Noise

The extensive use of Twitter by protestors in Iran, and the sharing of information from global audiences led to, as it has for several other movements, to an overflow of information noise online. The excess of available information and the continuous posting of information in real time on platforms such as Twitter, rendered these platforms partially useless for citizens to learn about events. This is due to the paradox of plenty, which argues that a excess flow of information results in poverty of attention (Nye, 2004). One can thus conclude that the more information is made available to users online the more overwhelmed they will be and find it difficult to find informative material. The overflow and continuous flow of incoming information online does not provide a comprehensive explanation of events but rather provided continuous updates of events through photographs, eye witness statements, reporting, and other information. Such overflow of information requires analysis of content for credibility, accuracy and informative value. The average citizen most likely does not do this, or has knowledge of how to. Moreover it often requires effort and engagement by a user to gain understanding of a conflict.

If one is not part of a specifically motivated interest group the mass media is the most accessible source of information since it easily mediates information. It does not require the analysis of information and searching for sources as the mass media employs professionals to do so. Furthermore accuracy and credibility is assumed if information comes from the mass media. Grignou and Patou refer to the excessive noise of information as “frame clouding” which is the “obscuring of the thematic visibility of the movement.” (Van de Donk, et al., 2004) Frame clouding makes it more difficult to access and find the correct information. For this reason frame clouding can lead to a loss of focus of the groups message which becomes diluted by

too much other information. As it did in the Iranian Green Revolution when the #CNNfail hashtag was used for tweet such as “Get your #cnnfail shirt in time for the next fail. <http://tinyurl.com/lwkng2>” / “Buy a #cnnfail shirt before they stop failing. Just kidding. But buy a shirt. <http://snipurl.com/k4bua>” (Twitter) This information is not relevant nor pertinent to the Green Revolution but it is still associated with the thematics and the information feed of the #CNNfail hashtag.

Frame clouding as the above tweet can distort the representation of a movement and its agenda through an overload of irrelevant information. Anyone is able to post information online, which allows any twitter user to utilize the #CNNfail or #IranRevolution hashtag. Thus being able to associate their content, without restriction, with the movements hashtag, either using it to to advocate or antagonize it. This makes online information a potentially unreliable news source. In contrast mass media is professionally produced while micro media resources are accessible to everyone. Therefore giving everyone the right to voice an opinion and spread information online without verification, as long as the user operates within the terms of service of the platform used. This is a possible hazard of micro and middle media because they can be used to spread disinformation. Moreover micro and middle media provide a easy utility for opposition movements and other global actors to cloud a movements voice.

ICTs and opposition use

Many governments have the ability to monitor their communication networks which allow them track activity online, intercept information, and surveillance users on micro and middle media platforms. Furthermore states can control access to websites by filtering content through blocking of IP and URL addresses, or removing websites. This allows governments to restrict online content state wide, particularly from websites that are based outside of the states jurisdiction. Hence states have significant power as they can implement Internet filtering and easily block access to resources utilized by opposition groups thus rendering them useless to Internet users within the country. In addition often individual users Internet activity can be monitored and tracked to find the users offline identity despite users efforts to remain anonymous.

During the Green Revolution the plentitude of images, documents, information and videos online served as a resource to the media and other actors by providing a continuous stream of information resources. Simultaneously the Iranian government had unrestricted access to the same information online. Actors could not restrict government or opposition access to information online since it was intended to be accessible by global audiences in public networks, and the content was hosted on platforms which are often owned and based outside of Iran.

For the case of Iran it gave the government easy access to information, provided online for activists, on how to bypass censorship, IP addresses for proxy servers, the strategies for the protests, meeting points, who the key information and coordinators were, and allowed for easy identification of citizens in videos and photographs. The ease of access to information online gave the government a tool to spy on their people without much effort. Traditionally governments had to infiltrate,

spy, threaten or torture people to give up information. But the nature of global access to information often gave information to the government and opposition without even asking for it.

The resources provided to the Iranian protestors, often by users outside of Iran who could not be persecuted but the government, could quickly render the information useless to Iranians. The users who were actually in Iran were directly targeted by the government through Internet surveillance. The Iranian government took advantage of the digital footprints left behind by (often untrained amateur) users making it easy to track and trace them, and potentially leading to their arrest. Such was the case for Persiankiwi (with over 39,000 followers) and Mousavi1388 (over 28,000 followers), who were among the most trusted sources of information with news agencies such as the New York Times and the Telegraph (Pitney, 2009). But on June 24th, 2009 Persianwiki ceased to post information and it is assumed that he or she was arrested (Pitney, 2009). While it is debatable how much protestors actually followed twitter as a information source during the protests Persianwiki was a vital news source, and considered to be credible, for the western media and the government eliminated it. While ICTs have reduced the cost to participate in acts of civil resistance through communicating, coordinating, and organizing they have also put activists at a higher risks because government can easily monitor, identify, and locate activists online.

Frame Clouding by the Opposition

Opposition groups and governments are able to utilize the same tools as activists to use them as part of their processes and mechanisms. Throughout the 2011 Syrian uprising the twitter #Syria hashtag was utilized to update and provide information about the events in Syria. During the uprising many twitter accounts were created which had no profile pictures and descriptions. These accounts began to attack the protestors and their criticism against the regime (Qtiesh, 2011). According to Global Voices Online “Those accounts were believed to be manned by Syrian Mokhabarat[intelligence] agents with poor command of both written Arabic and English, and an endless arsenal of bile and insults.” and “Several twitter users created lists to make it easier for the rest to track and reports those accounts for spam.” (Qtiesh, 2011)

Many of these accounts there where spam bots⁸ that were used to post predetermined tweets which were “configured to loop a specific set of tweets at predetermined intervals (usually between 2-5 minutes)” (Qtiesh, 2011) The spambots and control over accounts can be considered governments attempt to frame cloud information about the Syrian uprising by diluting the content posted with the #Syria hash tag with topics such as “photography, old Syrian sport scores, links to Syrian comedy shows, pro-regime news, and threats against a long list of tweets who expressed their support of the protests.” (Qtiesh, 2011) which changed the narrative of the #Syria hashtag and brought in a pro-government voice. This made Twitter a platform and broadcaster for the opposition as well. The government was able to communicate with its citizen directly through the mass media but also was able to

⁸ spambots are automated computer programs designed to send spam

set up automated defense mechanisms against Internet users speaking out against the government.

Governments use of ICTs against Civil Resistance

During the 2010 civil unrest in Tunisia the government embedded code onto websites which captured user information through a country-level keystroke software⁹. Whenever users in Syria logged on to a online accounts their username and passwords were recorded. Thus giving the government access to a multitude of accounts of Syrian citizens, and members part of the civil resistance movement. The government used many of these accounts, particularly Facebook to post information against the protestors and in support of the Tunisian government (Madrigal, 2011b). According to Sullivan from Facebooks security team when “a user, you just logged into some part of the cloud, Facebook or your email, say, and it snatched up that information. If you stayed persistently logged in, you were safe. It was those who logged out and came back that were open to the attack.” (Madrigal, 2011b) To counteract this Facebook implemented two security features. All Tunisian Facebook accounts were routed to an https server, which added a encryption protocol to information, and it implemented a “version of a ‘mother’s maiden name’ question to get access through your old password, it asks you to identify your friends in photos to complete an account login.” This prevented anyone that had logged out of their account to log back in with a captured password. This aided Tunisian online users and activists who’s accounts had been comprised and used to spread misinformation. Facebook’s motivation for changing the security of Facebook access from Tunisia was not rooted in supporting and aiding the Tunisian activists. However it was considered to be a “security issue around passwords and making sure that we protect the integrity of passwords and accounts,” and “It was very much a black and white security issue and less of a political issue.” For this case it was Facebooks choice to address the Tunisian governments actions and how they would police them because Facebook is a private corporation which makes its own decisions. Facebook is a private corporation that extends across national boundaries which has the power to respond to events and become a part of world politics which traditionally was a right reserved to governments, thus diffusing power from the state.

The utilization of ICTs by social movements differs as each movement has different needs. In some case ICTs aid mobilization of movements in others they supplement and support movements to communicate, coordinate, and share information internationally. Each organization has different demands, access, and trust for ICTs. In some countries as Burma ICTs are not widespread and the Internet penetration rate is 0.2 % which does not make organizing protests and events online effective. But ICTs had been utilized for the Saffron Revolution to document events and share information transnationally. ICTs were not a significant resources to Burmese citizens within the country as their is very little access to them and they are expensive. For allies of activists and international news agencies ICTs proved to be a valuable and vital tool to share information. Activists in Burma did not use mobile

⁹ Allows the tracking of the keys struck on a keyboard

phones and the Internet as a tool to organize but it was an essential tool communication transnationally and to disseminate information globally. Unlike the 888 uprising, in 1988, the Saffron Revolution documented events from the first day through videos, photographs, and witness testimony which was shared within the country and with international news sources. This gave global visibility to the 10,000 protestors and the violent crackdowns by the military against them. This led to pressure on the Burmese government and most likely was a key motivation to cut all communications methods so information about the brutal events in Burma would not reach the international agenda of governments, through the effort of a few individuals. Thus, despite the low internet penetration rate in Burma and low spread of ICTs the government considered them to be enough of a threat that it shut off all mobile phone and Internet communications for five days, on September 27th, 2009, to hinder communication among activists and the sharing of information within and outside of Burma. The control over communications technology makes it easy for government to easily undermine movements if they rely on ICTs for aspects of their civil resistance campaigns.

Chapter 4

The Future and Utility of ICTs for Civil Resistance

“There is more to life than increasing its speed.”

- Gandhi

The utility of ICTs has brought about many new resources for civil resistance movements and their opposition as well. This is changing the dynamic of how activists behave and can have considerable impacts. One has to ask if civil resistance relying on ICTs are successful and what it means to use ICTs for civil resistance and fail. Furthermore one has to consider the possible implications of the ownership of platforms used and everlasting information in our society.

Achieving Goals and Sustained action

Recent civil resistance movements have emerged quickly with extensive media coverage, and were often considered to be successful in reaching their goals. But It is difficult to define if movements as the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, or the Greek Indignant’s movement in 2011 can be considered successful and under what framework are they considered successful. The easiest way to determine success of a movement is if it has achieved its intended goals.

Many movement have clearly defined goals as they Egyptian Revolution in 2011, which had “The Demands of the Egyptian People” outlined in the “How to Protest Intelligently Revolution Manual” (Madrigal, 2011a) which was circulated among protestors and activists. Similarly Otpor outlined and set goals in the “Declaration for the Future of Serbia.”(Strategies) But many other movements have less defined and clear goals as it was the case for the 2011 protests in Spain and Greece, in which protestors expressed their frustrations and accused the government of corruption and blamed them for the high unemployment rates in their countries. But for both movements it is unclear of that the movements’ specific goals and demands were.

Civil resistance movements have to define and address the problem they are aiming to address by establishing movements frames, which will allow them to convince their audience of their cause. This is defined as frame alignment when frames are constructed which are necessary for movements to achieve change. Movement framing consists of two components: “the diagnostic element, or the definition of the problem and its source; and the prognostic element, the identification of an appropriation strategy for redressing the problem.” (McAdam, et al., 1996) The Egyptian Revolution satisfied both of these components and had defined their problems to be the government of Hosni Mubarak, the police brutality, state of emergency law, high unemployment, and corruption associated with it as its main problem. The needed steps for redressing the problem were given in “The Demands of the Egyptian People” which called for:

1. The downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and his ministers.
2. The cessation of the Emergency Law
3. Freedom
4. Justice
5. The formation of a new, non-military government with the interest of the Egyptian people at heart
6. The constructive administration of all of Egypt's resources. (Madrigal, 2011)

The Egyptian Revolution did achieve the first demand, with the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, along with his Prime Ministers Nazif and Shafik, and immediately transferred the power to the military.

Globally the media hailed the Egyptian revolution as a success and was celebrating it. News media praised Egypt and the overthrow of Mubarak by the people and a common headline emerged among news media asking if other countries would “follow Egypt's example?” The media particularly stressed and celebrated the role of social media as part of the revolution. Common headlines were “Egypt's revolution by social media” (Crovit, 2011) or “Egypt's Facebook Revolution” (Smith, 2011) Following the celebration of the overthrow of Mubarak the media concluded that Egypt was “on the path to democracy” and coverage of Egypt declined. But can the Egyptian revolution be considered to be successful since none of the other demands of the Egyptian people had been met.

In Egypt the protestors left Tahrir Square and as a result removed the political pressure on the state to push further to accomplish of their goals. While it did remove a powerful dictator, the new political sphere in Egypt needed to be supported through new political infrastructure. But protestors left after achieving the overthrow of Mubarak with no provisions to overlook the succeeding government. At the time of writing, six months after Tahrir square the country is still being rule by a military junta and emergency law has been extended for another two years (Rosen, 2010). Thus not much has improved within the Egyptian state aside from losing a political leader. Furthermore the overthrow of Mubarak gives ways for new politicians to step in and possibly abuses the power.

This seems to be a weakness of large protests that emerge, which are weakly linked, ideologically thin, rooted in long build up of frustrations against a symbolic scapegoat and without central leadership and representation. They disappear as quickly as they came because there is no follow through group that holds the new government accountable. Thus these movements often are not sustainable in the long term and have a short life span and do not necessarily achieve their goals. All of the above mentioned movements have found processes and mechanism that lead to collective action but are not able to effectively take advantage of their power. While many of these movements have effectively mobilized a significant amount of numbers they don't make demands and are uncertain of what they stand for. While they have the potential power to impose pressure on the government by asking for specific changes and providing practical ideas for government changes. These

movements have created political opportunities for themselves through mobilizing people for the common cause but surrender their power to bring about changes by having no sustained political agenda.

This occurred in the Philippines in 2001 for the “Coup De Text” (Jordan) where the EDSA II movement, ousted President Estrada, after crucial evidence in Estrada impeachment trial was dismissed. The outrage over the trial led to four days of protest which resulted in former vice-president Gloria Arroyo being sworn in as the new President. Arroyo was a key organizer in the four day uprising and mobilization, which was organized mainly through cell phones, against Estrada. The demonstrations against Estrada were organized through mass texting which allowed for the movement to mobilize quickly and organized flash mob like protests which overwhelmed the police. Moreover the quick communication and low cost of cell phones allowed for easy mobilization of the EDSA II movement mainly in front of the Presidential Palace in Manila. Cell phones allowed activists to avoid the ban on gatherings of small unauthorized groups. Instead people would linger around the area and when mobilized through a text all converge as a large group at once and overwhelm the police which was not able to respond. For the EDSA II movement cell phones proved invaluable because as it was “changing the organization and dynamics of protests, allowing leaders to control, virtually minute-by-minute, the movements of demonstrators, like military generals in the field. Using texts that communicate orders instantly, organizers can call for advances or retreats of waves of protesters.”(Jordan) The fast mobilization of people and activity led to the overthrow of Estrada and the people dispersed after they achieved their goal to overthrow the corrupt government. Shortly after EDSA III emerged, a seven day protest led by Estrada supporters, which was sparked by the arrest of former President Estrada but was unsuccessful in its objectives to remove President Arroyo and reinstate Estrada. Both EDSA II and III aimed to bring about a change in leadership to improve the conditions in the Philippines but it proved that a change in leadership did not improve the situation for the Filipino people despite having a new regime. The overthrow of President Estrada seemed to be the most tangible goal for citizen to bring change to the economic and political sphere in the Philippines but it proved that the following leaders had similar allegations of corruption.

The above mentioned movements were often sparked by specific events which gave these movement momentum to mobilize and voice their frustration and while they are powerful they do not come with a specific political agenda to change the conditions and sources of their grievances. These movements seem to be motivated by economic conditions, sparked by particular events, and serve as an outlet for the frustration of the public against a government figure which becomes to stand as a symbol for everything the people are frustrated with. But it seems that they also don't seem to be long term sustainable and effective in implementing or proposing policy for social change.

This was the case as well for many movements part of or inspired by the Arab Spring. Inspired by the celebrated (media) success of the Egyptian revolution protest movements emerged all over the Arab world and Europe. Many of these protests were organized themselves through social media, many not having other

foundations of organization and plans. Most of these movements have come out to voice their frustration with their government and their economic situations but often lacked clear movement framing. If one examines the 2011 “Indignant” movements in Spain and Greece it is very clear what the frustration are. The Greek Indignant and Spanish 15-M movements blames the government for the high unemployment, and the economic crisis in their respective countries. In Greece the movement was upset with the possible default of Greek debts, the proposed austerity measures and their need for them. Both movements in Spain and Greece have quickly assembled and occupied public spaces to voices frustration and sentiments but were lacking clear focus, goals, and proposed solutions and demands. While these movements had mobilized strong presence in numbers the government could not negotiate with them because these movements were not asking or insist on any detailed demands.

These movements are opposed to the proposed government policies but do not provide constructive criticisms and solutions. Following Egypt’s revolution there has been a common belief that public mobilization and occupation of spaces will lead to pressure and easy solutions. While these movements did receive worldwide media attention none of them are as extensively organized and defined as Egypt, and lack basic measures such as spokespeople, which will represent them or a plan to redress the problems. While bringing together a large public body of citizens will create pressure through publicity policy makers cannot respond or negotiate with these movements lack cohesion and have no political agenda.

Immortality of Information

Activists and movements utilize ICTs to report and document events online. Photographs will be uploaded to Twitter, videos are shared on Youtube, flyers, resources, and pamphlets are stored on GoogleDocuments, networks are built on Facebook, writing from activists is on blogs, and twitter provides timelines of events. This helps to document a movement and details about the events while it is going on. But this information remains available online after the event and the media coverage and public attention for it simply fades. Thus the information will be accessible to anyone at anytime.

The Internet has led to information being recorded continuously and remains accessible indefinitely. Online content has a unprecedented level of permanence unlike any other medium. (Rosen, 2010) Cyberscholar Viktor Mayer-Schönberger cites Stacy Snyder’s case as a reminder of the importance of “societal forgetting.” By “erasing external memories,” he states that, “our society accepts that human beings evolve over time, that we have the capacity to learn from past experiences and adjust our behavior.” and Rosen highlights that before

In traditional societies, where missteps are observed but not necessarily recorded, the limits of human memory ensure that people’s sins are eventually forgotten. By contrast, Mayer-Schönberger notes, a society in which everything is recorded “will forever tether us to all our past actions, making it impossible, in practice, to escape them (Rosen, 2010)

This has implications for online identities and content available online. Activists and their actions can be identified long after events and their reputation can be severely damaged. Following events of civil resistance, despite being successful or not, the opposition movement can still access information about activists online while the movement has demobilized. Tools such as facial recognition software make it easy for opposition groups to go through a large number of photographs found online and identify activists and go after them. This was the case for the Iranian Green Revolution where the government heavily searched online content which contained information about activists. One can thus assume that the extensive use of ICTs to mobilize and share information with global media has the potential to be very harmful to civil resistance movements.

Furthermore the permanence of online content stands the risk of being read and accessed out of context. Furthermore information online often is difficult to verify and has the potential to lack credibility which can lead to the spread of false information which cannot be corrected or deleted. When Tunisian activists' Facebook and Twitter accounts were hacked by the government they were used to spread the government's voice and slander the opposition movement. This information was associated with the identity of the users' accounts, while many others were aware that the government had gained access to users' accounts. Still the information could be misconceived. Shortly after it was revealed that the government was utilizing citizens' online accounts to spread propaganda and false information and people were aware not to trust this information.

But if people did not actively pursue or regain access to their accounts to delete the false information then it would remain online and associated with their online identity. If an individual researches the protests movement in Tunisia several months after the event and came across this online content it will stand uncorrected and will most likely be misconstrued. Firstly the information will be read out of context in terms of time, space, and common knowledge cannot be assumed. During the events in Tunisia citizens were aware that the government spread misinformation online and were aware not to believe it.

A person coming across this information at a later time will be presented to information that is out of context. He will not be surrounded by the online noise during the revolution that informed people of false information. There might have been tweets going all over informing people but the speed, real time of information and overload lets' information become invisible very quickly. Furthermore if a user whose account was compromised did not regain access to his account then the information will remain online and uncorrected. Through this one loses control over information and how it is understood in the future.

Traditionally history of contentious politics were written by the winning party. Now online one has the option to research or come across information from individuals, organizations, governments, and news agencies involved. All have their own accounts of events and their perspectives will differ. How an event will be remembered and perceived by people who were not part of it depends on what online sources they will look at, and under what context they understand this information. The permanence of information leaves the risk that information which does not expire can be read by anyone with potentially no understanding and

knowledge of the events, the history and culture of the people, and the complexities that lead to the events. While the information uploaded during events serves as a tool for reporting it also serves a form of permanent documentation and evidence.

Online content of information is taking on the shape of doing this as for example the entire digital archive of Twitter has been donated to the United States Library of Congress. This will serve as a Tweet Archive and according to James H. Billington, the Librarian of Congress, has “extraordinary potential for research into our contemporary way of life,” (Raymond, 2010) and

This information provides detailed evidence about how technology based social networks form and evolve over time. The collection also documents a remarkable range of social trends. Anyone who wants to understand how an ever-broadening public is using social media to engage in an ongoing debate regarding social and cultural issues will have need of this material. (Raymond, 2010)

Billington added

The Library looks at this as an opportunity to add new kinds of information without subtracting from our responsibility to manage our overall collection. Working with the Twitter archive will also help the Library extend its capability to provide stewardship for very large sets of born-digital materials. (Raymond, 2010)

This leaves Twitter as one of the most informative resources for the future and researching past events as part of history. Another example for this was two months after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution the book “Tweets from Tahrir” by OR Book was released to provide a narrative of the events in Egypt. The book contains a collection of Twitter messages which will provide a narrative and timeline of the revolution in 140 character tweets.

This makes a large amount of information available if people want to research events and has the potential to shape the perception of historical events. History is dependent on witnessing through people, memories, photographs, and videos which are now provided by non-state actors and individuals. Many civil resistance have citizen media attached to it which creates a vast amount of collective memories online.

ICTs and private ownership

Information and Communication technologies have created connections and communication globally. Technologies such as Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, Skype and blogs allowed for the communication, interaction, and formation of communities with others online while overstepping national boundaries. The Internet is an unprecedented medium for global communication yet they are owned by private companies and cooperations which have transitional reach. This has several implications which Jillian York demonstrates through this “Free expression,

as defined in my home country, the United States, and by Article 19 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, does not apply to privately-owned spaces. In the past, this conundrum has led to controversy and, occasionally, court cases regarding company towns and shopping malls.” (York, 2011) As the previous statement highlights that the right to free expression extends to public spaces not private. Thus it does not encompass a large number of ICTs which have a global reach and presence such as Facebook, blogger, Twitter, Youtube, Flickr, LiveJournal, Skype, or blogging platforms but their content is controlled and governed by it’s own Terms of Service.

Many of these technologies have been used for civil resistance, such as Facebook and Twitter, are platforms that have not been developed for protest and activist purposes, thus they do not necessarily cater to their needs. Activists have appropriated the use of these to their needs. One of the few who promotes citizens news and activists work is YouTube which has set up “Citizentube” which is YouTube's News and Politics Blog. The intended use for Citizentube is describe by YouTube as the place where “you'll find important breaking news videos from citizens; developing trends in the use of YouTube by news organizations, activists, politicians, and governments.” (Citizentube, 2011) Citizentube was introduced in 2007 and is a rarity, since it provides platform that deliberately makes media available for political use and allows the platform to be used as a activist tool.

All of these tools enable activists and people in different ways but ICTs such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, or Blackberry networks all are owned by private cooperations. These platforms have the power to function transnationally, and are used globally and have played important roles in world politics. This leads to a shift and diffusion in power because these platforms have enabled individuals globally to act, produce information, and interact with others globally. But it is a private corporation which exerts the control over the platforms which individuals choose to utilize. Nye argues that with this “Privatization and public-private partnerships will increase.” which takes away power from institution and as he argues and diffuses power to corporations. This gives power to these corporations since “Many of these organizations will have soft power of their own as they attract citizens into coalitions that cut across national boundaries.” (Nye, 2004) This gives private and individual actors more power to act but it also provides less restrictions on how they will use these tools. The owners of platforms such as Facebook have significant power now because they can police and control the tools through which audiences globally communicate and they provide the framework for them. This is a power they have which extends worldwide and to the countries they have presence in.

Conclusion

Civil resistance movements have developed process and mechanism to create political opportunity for themselves. The utilization of Information and Communication Technologies has proven to be an effective resource for individual activists and civil movements, which can make use of it. Incorporating ICTs into movements mechanisms and processes in relation to their needs for them. These tools can be used to enable brokerage and diffusion, which will allow movements to coordinate collective action very quickly and in large numbers. But these tools are not the criteria that bring about success to a movements campaigns and goals.

Creating political opportunities is not done by ICTs but can often be achieved through integrating them into a movements campaign. The case of Belarus, Moldova, and Burma has shown that mobile and communication technology do not need to be widespread to be effectively used for civil resistance. ICTs have the ability to coordinate and mediate information quickly while being mobile which is helpful to movements as it also them to immediately respond to opposition actions and uphold larger networks of activists, despite physical distances. ICTs have rather aided these movements to diffuse power away from the government by creating political opportunities to undermine the governments hard and soft power. The strength that ICTs have brought for collective coordination and brokerage is their ability to allow easier participation in civil resistance as they have made it significantly cheaper to communicate with others outside of their direct environment. Furthermore they have allowed civil resistance movements to respond to events that they were not directly at, as the Plan B tactics by Optor, and to respond and communicate with an entire group during events, such as protests through text messaging.

Simultaneously the use of ICTs creates as many weaknesses as advantages for movements because mobile and communication networks and resources can easily be monitored and governments can interrupt service to them. If activists make extensive use of online tools they are also risking their anonymity and identity to be found out by the government, which can lead to consequences for them online and offline. Furthermore the global access to information and ability to be active online can be harmful to movements as they can be used or to spread misinformation or for frame clouding.

However civil resistance movements that oppose the nation state need to have clearly established motifs and demands which they communicate to the their opposition. Furthermore to effectively bring about change within society and politics there needs to be a sustained movement, which will ensure that the demands made will be met. Clear movement frames are helpful to establish a movement furthermore it will make it easier for the government to respond and negotiate their demands. Civil resistance movements as the 15-M movement, the Egyptian Revolution, EDSA II, or the Greek Indignant Citizens movement had the power to negotiate with the government if it had defined demands for their movements because they had establish themselves within the political sphere as a event to

respond to. But without demands and goals governments would only have to wait for these movements mobilization to fade.

The use of ICTs can create opportunities and weaknesses depending on their utilisation. What did paper did not examine and which needs to be further explored is what mechanism and process lead from online activism to offline action. For future research one needs to further how ICTs have been used to incite violence and oppression, as it has happened in the Rwandan Genocide through propaganda and the radio or during the 2008 Kenyan election crisis where cell phones were used to incite violence. In addition one should examine how ICTs have enable transnational protests and coordination of them,

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